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Abst rac t - -The  paper discusses the origins and structure of Preference Semantics, a procedural 
and computational system for extracting the meaning structure of natural anguage texts, based on 
notions of "maximal semantic density" and coherence. The basic representational structures and 
procedures of Preference Semantics are described, as well as the forms these notions have taken in 
the work of others. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Preference Semantics (PS from now on) has its philosophical origins in [1,2], where it was argued 
that: 
(1) to have a meaning is to have one from among a set of possible meanings; 
(2) giving meaning is the process of choosing or preferring among those; 
(3) meanings are, if anything, only other symbols, usually the words of the explanations we 
give to convey meanings to others; and 
(4) referential accounts of meaning receive too much attention, since we hardly ever point at 
anything in order to give, or clarify, meaning in adult communication. 
The first and second assumptions have a procedural f avor and only the third a representational 
one: PS is primarily a procedural theory but it has nonetheless been strongly associated with a 
particular kind of network representation. 
PS was developed as a computational semantic theory of natural language. The main topic 
addressed has always been semantic ambiguity, lexical ambiguity, case ambiguity, and anaphoric 
ambiguity in line with the first and second assumptions above. Special attention has also been 
paid to interpreting metaphor, learning new word senses (sense xtension) and producing a robust 
theory that can always produce some interpretation ofa sentence. Section 2 describes PS in more 
detail. 
2. PREFERENCE SEMANTICS 
PS is a theory of language in which the meaning of a text is represented by a complex semantic 
structure that is built up out of components; this compositionality is a typical feature of semantic 
theories. The principal difference between PS and other semantic theories is in the explicit and 
computational treatment of ambiguous, metaphorical, and non-standard language use. It is an 
assumption of PS that these features of natural anguage use are standard and endemic and no 
theory of language can ignore them. 
The original application of PS in the mid 1960s was to the semantic analysis of philosophical 
texts [3,4]. In the early 1970s, Wilks developed an English-French machine translation system [5]. 
Since the theory is procedural, rather than representational, it has been possible to provide some 
empirical tests of its claims and the results have been encouraging: see [6--8], discussed later. 
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P.1. Main Principles 
The main principles of PS, which underlie the sequence of papers [3,5,9,10], are as follows: 
(a) Computational Semantics 
Some of the following principles are part of a general trend within artificial intelligence and 
computational linguistics that can be called computational semantics [11]--a trend opposed not 
only to independent syntactic processing and to model-theoretic semantics, but also opposed to 
a central theme in artificial intelligence that could be styled "naive knowledge-based processing" 
or, in its extreme form, expert systems. 
That extreme form could be identified with the claim that, if adequate knowledge structures 
are available to a parser, then practical problems of language semantics (lexical ambiguity, etc.) 
do not arise--the answer to which is that the claim is false, unless the domain chosen is trivial. 
Computational semantics, however, is not marked off from knowledge realms and their formal 
expression: on the contrary, knowledge of language and "the world" are not separable, just as 
they are not separable into data bases called, respectively, dictionaries and encyclopedias. 
(b) Procedural Semantics 
Procedures can give the meaning of quantifiers and other symbols (see [12]). In PS, the 
description of the representation a d the mechanisms that generate it should, ideally, all be 
procedural and the representation itself should be the product of a few, general and autonomous 
(not content-dependent) procedures. The procedural semantics idea goes back to the "meaning as 
use" slogan of Wittgenstein [13] and the operationalist explanations ofsymbols of Bridgman [14], 
and is central to the work of, e.g., Winogrnd [15] and Woods [16]. 
(c) Least Effort Principle 
Procedures should be consistent with a Least Effort principle of language understanding [9,17] 
of doing the minimum amount of analysis necessary, a consequence of which is that linguistic 
forms, however well-formed on other grounds, which require excessive processing cannot, and 
should not, be understood. 
(d) Preference 
The appropriate, which is to say the most internally coherent, representation should be chosen 
for a text from among competing representations. Certain representational structures can be 
seen as "preferring" other associated representations, and an overall representation for a text is 
produced by allowing maximal satisfaction or "best fit" of all such preferences, which will mean 
(as in the political analogy on which the notion is based) that some constituent representations 
do not have their local preferences satisfied. Consider: 
"My car drinks gasoline." (1) 
"John ran a mile." (2) 
On the PS view, the violation of preferences, such as the preference of 'drinks' for an animate 
agent in (1) above, and the preference of 'ran' for zero object in (2), is normal and must not be 
treated as an exceptional matter outside the core of English. Such locutions are statistically so 
normal, and so easily understood even when wholly novel, that their representation a d processing 
must be part of the central processes of a language understander. 
(e) Semantic Parsing 
This principle, also held by, among others, the Conceptual Dependency (hereafter CD) group 
at Yale [18-21], is that English can be parsed to a semantic representation without a module 
devoted explicitly to syntactic analysis, and without traditional syntactic lassification of words 
or sentence components (e.g., N, NP, VP). The necessary generalizations for parsing can all be 
expressed in the terms needed for the semantic representation. Moreover, these need not result 
in any kind of text 'skimming' that misses essential features of the text and its content. 
(f) Beliefs 
Analysis of the relationships found in text and the representation of that text is a function of the 
beliefs of the analysis system [22]. Thus, the analysis of (I) depends on what the system believes 
about drinking and about cars (thus crossing what would be, for nanny, a semantic-pragmatic 
boundary) and, likewise, the analysis of (2) depends on beliefs about running and distance (and 
so similarly for the so-called syntax-semantics distinction and the class of "intransitive verbs"). 
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(g) Level of Representation 
The level of representation required for natural anguage understanding is not fixed, but can 
be at any appropriate l vel that the representational scheme allows. However, there need be no 
assumption that all knowledge of the world must be in such a representation: much shallower 
levels will serve for many purposes. 
(h) Semantic Primitives 
The representation is based on a set of semantic primitives of differing types (actions, sub- 
stantives, qualities, etc.) but no claims are made that the set is universal: there could be many 
alternative sets for special tasks, domains or cultures. All that is required is there be some 
privileged set to generate a representation, even though these primitives may in the end be no 
different in type from (non-privileged) words of the language (see [23]). 
(i) Linear Boundaries of Language 
The representation emphasizes the linear, rather than the recursive properties of language: its 
structure therefore mphasizes the linear boundaries of clauses and phrases (with no special role 
for sentences) as a basis for a surface representation from which progressively deeper epresen- 
tations can be obtained by inference. The representational item corresponding to the piece of 
language between two such boundaries (whether a word or a sentence) we call a template, which 
is a complex structure (see below) having no associations with the term as used to denote astring 
of surface items, as in vision analysis. 
(j) Not Model Theoretic 
The representation need not be of the model theoretic type, and the classic problems of quan- 
tilication, etc., can be dealt with by special procedures. From the PS point of view, the errors 
of model theoretic semantics were that it ignored the fact that language always reached other 
symbols as referents, not unambiguous objects (the latter criticism was made most forcefully by 
Quine [24]), and that it ignored an essential feature of natural anguages: their constant sense 
extensibility (see [25]). 
2.2. Bases of the Theory 
PS contains a number of kinds of knowledge representation a d process. The following types 
of knowledge representation are used for language analysis in the theory: 
(1) 80-100 semantic "elements" or primitives; 
(2) semantic formulas, which represent word senses; 
(3) bare templates, which represent basic "messages"; 
(4) templates, which represent clauses; 
(5) paraplates, which represent the senses of prepositions; 
(6) common-sense inference rules, which are used for resolving anaphora; 
(7) semantic blocks, which represent whole texts; 
and, post-1975, 
(8) thesaurus structure, which provides hierarchical structure; and 
(9) pseudo-texts, which represent both text structure and the contingent, factual, aspect of 
"frame structures." 
Five different kinds of processes were used for language analysis: 
(1) template xpansion, which evaluates selection restrictions; 
(2) preference, which chooses the semantically most dense semantic reading; 
(3) TIE routines (see below), which apply paraplates to correct structures corresponding to
prepositional phrases; 
(4) extractions, which deepen templates by expanding their case subparts and applying com- 
mon sense inference rules; 
and, post-1975, 
(5) projection rules, which attempt o interpret metaphor. 
The semantic primitives (knowledge representation #1) used in the Preference Semantics Sys- 
tem were originally derived from a system of biological classification devised by Richens [26]. 
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An appendix to [23] gives the most complete description of the primitives used in PS. One 
hundred and three primitives are listed there. Of the 103, 15 are "class" primitives which are 
prefixed by asterisks to distinguish them from the remaining 88, e.g., *ANI (the class of animate 
entities) includes MAN (the class of human beings). 
The primitives divide into four main groups--cases, actions, substantives, and qualifiers plus 
two "miscellaneous elements." There are 21 case primitives ([23] states that there are 19, but 21 
are listed) including SUBJ (the agent case) and OBJE (the object case) and *DIRE (the general 
direction case). There are 34 action primitives, including GET (obtaining some thing or sub- 
stance) and GIVE (yielding up some thing or substance). There are 30 substantive primitives 
consisting of 11 class elements ([23] states "12" but only lists 11) and 19 non-class elements 
including SPREAD (an extension) and GRAIN (any kind of structure). There are 16 qualifier 
elements, including GOOD (morally correct or approved), MAL (indicates the sex of the entity 
qualified is male) and FEM (indicates the sex of the entity qualified is female). 
"POT 
EVNTSTATE ACT SIGN THIS FOLKMAN BEAST PLANT PART POINTSPnEADLINETHINGGRAIN STUFF WHOLE 
Figure 1. Semantic network of substantive primitives in Preference Semantics (from 
[2~, p. 48]). 
The case, substantive, and action primitives are viewable as small, hierarchically organized 
semantic networks in which the primitives appear as nodes. The network for substantive primi- 
tives, which is much more complex than those for the others, is given in Figure 1. The arcs of the 
network, which are unlabelled, denote class inclusion. Below are definitions of the 11 substantive 
class primitives from [23]. 
*POT 
*ANIMAR 
*ENT 
*MAR 
*ANI 
*INAN 
*AC 
*HUM 
*PLA 
*PHYSOB 
*SOF 
any "potent" entity (i.e., *ANI, STATE, PART, ACT, PLANT) 
*ANI*MAR 
any entity (i.e., covered by THIS, POINT, FOLK, MAN, GRAIN, PART, 
THING, BEAST, SIGN, SPREAD, or LINE) 
any "mark-like" entity (i.e., THIS, SIGN, ACT, STATE) 
any animate ntity (i.e., THIS, MAN, FOLK, BEAST or SIGN) 
any inanimate ntity (i.e., THIS, PART, GRAIN, STUFF, THING, LINE, 
SPREAD) 
any "act definer" (i.e., THIS, ACT, EVNT) 
any human entity (i.e., THIS, MAN, FOLK) 
any "place definer" (i.e., THIS, POINT, SPREAD, PART) 
any physical object (i.e., THIS, THING, MAN, BEAST, SPREAD, PLANT, 
PART) 
any "malleable" entity (i.e., THIS, PART, WHOLE, GRAIN, STUFF) 
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Semantic formulas (representation #2) are constructed out of semantic primitives and rep- 
resent individual senses of words. Formulas are constructed from subformulas using a form of 
dependency s ntax. A subformula is any left-right pair whose two members are either a primitive 
or another subformula. The right-hand element is the governor and the left-hand element he 
dependent. The very rightmost element of a semantic formula is its head, which represents the 
"main element" in the sense, e.g., whether a noun refers to a MAN or a THING, or whether a 
verb denotes an act of THINKing or of DOing. 
In a semantic formula the top level subformulas are usually case subformulas which have as 
their principal (rightmost) elements the case primitives SUB J, OBJE, GOAL (Purpose) and INST 
(Instrument). 
The following is a simplified semantic formula for the action 'drink': 
((*ANI SUBJ) (((FLOW STUFF) OBJE) (MOVE CAUSE))))) 
One can tell that this formula is for an action because its head, CAUSE, is an action element. 
Reading the formula: drinking is a causal action, preferably done by animate things (*ANI SUBJ) 
to liquids ((FLOW STUFF) OBJE). The SUBJ case displays the preferred agent of an action, 
and the OBJE case the preferred object or patient. Below is the semantic formula for the action 
'fire at': 
((*HUM SUBJ) ((*ANI OBJE) ((STRIK GOAL) ((THING INST) 
((THING MOVE) 
CAUSE))))) 
It is an action, preferably done by human things, which uses an instrument (a gun) to cause a 
thing (a bullet) to move, with the goal of striking an animate thing. 
Later, Wilks [28] argued that, since no real distinction existed between primitives and words 
(the former being just a privileged subset of the latter) there could be "mixed-type" representa- 
tions in which English words are inserted into semantic formulas. For example, the words 'gun' 
and 'bullet' are inserted into the semantic formula for 'fire at' to give: 
((*HUM SUB J) ((*ANI OBJE) ((STRIK GOAL) ((gun INST) ((bullet MOVE) CAUSE))))) 
These formulas were described as "re-entrant" because formulas are mentioned inside each other, 
i.e., 'gun' and 'bullet' have their own semantic formulas elsewhere in the system. Wilks saw these 
"mixed-type" formulas as a notational convenience: 
" ... in that 'gun' in a formula for 'shoot' is now just a shorthand form for the formula for 
'gun' existing elsewhere in the system. This makes the formulas easier to read for a human 
user, by avoiding the insertion of too much material in terms of primitives into the body of 
the formula itself" [29]. 
A bare template (representation #3) is a structure containing the "gist" of a message. Each 
bare template contains three primitives, an agent-action-object triple (once again, a case-llke 
structure). There is a list of these bare templates, corresponding to numerous basic message 
forms. 
"The crook drank some beer." (3) 
In analyzing (3), the heads are obtained for the semantic formulas of 'crook,' drink' and 'beer.' 
Suppose 'crook' has two senses, the less probable one being a shepherd's crook or staff, with the 
heads [crook (MAN)] and [crook (THING)]. 'Drink' has the head CAUSE and 'beer' has the head 
(FLOW STUFF). Two candidate interpretations are produced: 
[MAN CAUSE (FLOW STUFF)] 
[THING CAUSE (FLOW STUFF)] 
These are compared against he list of bare templates and, should one not match, it is rejected. 
Those structures that remain are expanded into templates. The origin of such "gist" structures 
is to be found in Masterman's work [30]. 
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A template (representation #4) is a structure, based on agent, action, and object slots for three 
semantic formulas that can themselves have dependent formulas, such that the whole structure 
represents a possible "message," and can contain any number of formulas. Each fragment of 
a sentence (clause or phrase) has a corresponding template; the existence of more than one 
template per fragment is representational ambiguity. That ambiguity is reduced by examining 
1) the internal "fit" of templates, and 2) the ties between templates for successive fragments of 
text. 
The template zpansion algorithm (process #1) seeks to resolve this. It consults the formulas 
in each template and looks at their case subparts to see if their preferences are satisfied. (In 
what follows, [square brackets] denote the semantic formula for a word-sense. So, for example, 
[crook(MAN)] denotes the formula for the human sense of the word 'crook' where MAN is the 
head primitive.) [drink] prefers an animate thing as agent. [crook (MAN)] can satisfy this 
preference but [crook (THING)] cannot. [drink] prefers a liquid as object; this is available in 
both representations. 
So we have (in the following, --, or *-- represents satisfied preferences) 
[crook (MAN)] --, [drink] ~ [beer (FLOW STUFF)] 
[crook (THING)] --, [drink] *-- [beer (FLOW STUFF)] 
The first of these has the largest number of satisfied preferences, or greater "semantic density," 
so it is chosen because the process of preference (process #2) chooses the template with the most 
satisfied preferences, i.e., the semantically most dense semantic reading available. 
So, a template is a simple graph of three nodes, where any number of other nodes can depend 
on each of the three. Each node (original or dependent) can be expanded as a formula tree. A 
certain amount of ingenuity was required to force clauses and phrases of English, say, into this 
format: prepositional phrases by convention had the sense of the preposition functioning at the 
central, action, node accompanied by a dummy agent. 
Triples Notation 
(CLYDE, ISA, ELEPHANT) 
(CLYDE, COLOR, GRAY) 
(CLYDE, LEGS, 4) 
Predicate Notation 
tea (clyde, elephant) 
color(clyde, gray) 
legs(clyde, 4) 
Netvork Notation 
clyde - - - i sa - - -  elephant 
clyde - - - co lo r - - -  gray 
clyde - - - legs - - -  4 
Frame notat ion 
[clyde, 
[ l i sa ,  elephant], 
[color,  gray],  
[legs, 4]]] 
Figure 2. Identical information represented in four notations. 
In a sense, the underlying triple structure of the template is just another notational variant 
on predicates, semantic networks, frames, etc., as shown in Figure 2. In the notations, the 
"relational" primitive (ISA, COLOR, or LEGS) occupies, respectively, the middle element of the 
triple, the function name of the predicate, the arc label of the network, and the slot-name of the 
frame. 
Paraplates (representation #5) are used to represent the case ambiguity of prepositions. Para- 
plates are essentially patterns that span two templates, ordered from specific to general. 
"He left Comano by the autostrada." (4) 
"He left Comano by car." (5) 
"He left Comano by following the arrows." (6) 
For example, the preposition 'by' expresses various case relations in the examples above. In (4), 
'by' is DIRECTION; in (5), the INSTRUMENT case; and in (6), it is the DIRECTION case 
again. 
The Preference S mantics family 211 
(*ANI) (MOVE) (WHERE POINT) --* [] [] (WHERE LINE) 
(*ANI) (MOVE) (WHERE POINT) - ,  [] [] (*REAL) 
(*ANI) (MOVE) (WHERE POINT) --. [] (*DO) (WHERE SIGN) 
Sentences (4) to (6) have the above paraplates mapped to them, where [ ] represents a dummy 
agent. Each paraplate can be thought of as expressing a case (those given above). For each 
paraplate, the three elements before the arrow are mapped onto the template representing a 
clause preceding the preposition, and all these paraplates match the first clause of each of (4), 
(5) and (6). The three elements following the arrow are mapped onto the template representing 
the clause following the preposition. 
TIE routines (process #3) are used to apply the paraplates. The routines attempt o "tie" 
the templates, for clauses urrounding a preposition, to the ordered stack of paraplates for that 
preposition, until a paraplate is found that is general enough to match. The paraplates are 
applied as a stack ordered, as mentioned previously, from specific at the top to general at the 
bottom. The top one is always applied first. The paraplate found determines the case between 
the main clause and prepositional phrase. 
"The soldiers fired at the women and I saw several of them fall." (7) 
The problem in (7) is to resolve the ambiguity of 'them' as women rather than soldiers. In 
such cases, where the tie routines will not resolve the anaphora, common sense inference rules 
(representation #6) are used. The one needed here is: 
[1 strikes animate2] ---, [animate2 falls]. 
The process of extraction (process #4) is used here. It operates on template representations 
and infers new template forms from the case subparts of formulas. For (7), a template form 
[soldiers strike women] is produced by deepening the formula for 'fire at': women being the 
OBJEct of the firing action. [soldiers trike women] matches the left hand side of the common 
sense inference rule above, hence, the inference that the women fell. 
A semantic block (representation #7) represents a paragraph (or even a whole text). It consists 
of templates bound together by paraplates and common sense inferences. 
After 1975, a thesaurus (representation #8) structure was added because it "provides the 
lexical specificity that primitive representations lack" ([29, p. 107]). Wilks [10] describes his idea 
of a thesaurus in some detail. A thesaurus, like Roget's, is a grouping of English words into 
semi-synonymous rows, usually having the same part of speech type. These rows are grouped 
under one of about a thousand heads, which in turn are grouped under about ten very general 
sections. These general Roget heads could be identified with such primitives as MAN, THING, 
and perhaps other primitives corresponding to the section names from Roget's Thesaurus, e.g., 
#Abstract Relations (GP~IN), #Space (WHERE), #Matter (STUFF), #Intellect (THINK), 
#Volition (GOAL), etc. [10, p. 215]. 
Under the very general section #Volition we might find the head, say #22 propulsion, and 
under that we would find a subhead #221 firer, attached to some row of "firer" words: 
#221 firer: gun, bow, rifle, howitzer ... 
Similarly, row #222 projectile might name projectiles, e.g., bullet, arrow. 
Heads, subheads and row members all have associated semantic formulas. Po3w-co-members, 
e.g., 'gun' and 'bow' should have common parts to their formulas, e.g., all are THINGS, all have a 
GOAL of hitting something. This common part should be the simpler, more general formula for 
that tOT'S subhead, #firer. This progressive generalization should extend right up the thesaurus 
to the general section names [10, p. 205]. The thesaurus imposes a hierarchy of formulas and 
pseudo-texts, where row members will have structurally similar pseudo-texts. 
The pseudo-text (representation #9) is Wilks' conception of a frame. "A pseudo-text is a 
structure of factual and functional information about a concept or item" [10, p. 208]. A pseudo- 
text is composed of templates linked by case ties, exactly the case ties that the TIE routines 
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above would impose. Hence, a pseudo text i~ not only a frame-like knowledge structure, but is 
also identical to the representation that a PS parser would output. On this view, as noted at the 
beginning, precompiled knowledge structures and those derived from texts are of the same type. 
A pseudo-text for 'car' is shown in [10, p. 208]. Its first two lines refer to the insertion of fuel; 
the next three to the fact that the gasoline-using engine moves the car; and the last four to the 
way the driver turning the wheel changes the direction of the car. This entity is pointed to by 
the token "car" which also points to the semantic formula [car]. 
The pseudo-texts for general primitives like MAN (which could then be equated to very gen- 
eral heads at the top of the thesaurus, in this case "Humanity") would consist of very general 
assertional forms like: 
MAN HAVE THING 
MAN THINK SIGN 
MAN WANT THING 
which are also exactly the forms of bare templates (see above). 
"Readers will have remarked that the whole formula/pseudo-text distinction rests on some 
intuitive meaning/factual distinction that cannot be formally justified ... I think one can 
only say that the meaning/factual distinction, even if not philosophically sound, does have 
some role in our understanding" [10, p. 221]. 
By contrast, Charniak's frames [31] put both formula-like and fact-like information in the 
same formalism, although a reader can easily detect which is which. The notion of connecting 
the generality expressed by the primitives with the generality of taxonomy to be found in the 
"upper" heads of a thesaurus i also due to Masterman [32]. 
The process of projection (process #5) operates on pseudo-texts. A brief example of projection 
is given for sentence (1). Projection operates only on preference violations. The best represen- 
tation of (1) contains a preference violation ("car drinks"), so projection is used. The algorithm 
compares the template representation 
[my+car drink gasoline] 
for (1) against templates from the pseudo-text of 'car' seeking the closest match, and selects 
[ICengine (USE) #liquid] because a car has an IC (internal combustion) engine and gasoline is a 
liquid. (USE) is then projected onto "drink" in the sentence representation, which becomes 
[my+car use gasoline]. 
In a later development of PS, pseudo-texts were used as the representational basis for a theory 
of beliefs [22,33,34]: they became structures (renamed environments) that were to be considered 
as the set of beliefs of an individual about a topic, which might in turn be another believer. An 
algorithm was given for nesting such belief environments so as to produce default structures for 
the beliefs of believers by inference, i.e., not known directly. The only real connection to PS was 
an argument that, since such nested belief structures were required for understanding the utter- 
ances and texts of others, only some such default projection would be plausible as a least-effort 
realization of what would otherwise be an over-massive computational enterprise. It is argued 
strongly [35] at this stage that belief is essentially involved in natural anguage understanding, 
and that many of the phenomena discussed above (e.g., metaphoricity, prepositional phrase at- 
tachment, differences in meanings and anaphoric reference across individuals) should be seen as 
differences of belief. 
In another later development [36], an algorithm was given that established the ties binding 
templates for prepositional phrases into the semantic block, based not on paraplates but on the 
preferences of the principal words of the sentence: nouns, verbs and prepositions. PS was never 
properly extended to handle phrase attachment until this 1985 "walk through" algorithm. The 
algorithm located the best structure by a two-pass processing of a sentence, once leftwards and 
The Prefecence Semantics family 213 
once rightwards. That alone showed that it was not a plausible psychological process, but that 
has never been a principal aim of PS. In a test against other methods of attachment [6] this 
algorithm performed the best. 
Readers may have noticed that in the preceding description of PS, the term "preference" had 
several different but related meanings. Two different meanings of "preference" were noted in [37]. 
The first meaning of "preference" is as a selection restriction in the manner of [38]. These pref- 
erences are found in semantic formulas (representation ~2) and paraplates (representation ~5) 
and, in a weak form, in bare templates (representation ~4). Hence, in the semantic formula 
for 'drink' shown earlier, its agent preference is the primitive *ANI and the object preference is
(FLOW STUFF). 
The second meaning of "preference" is as a boolean value, either satisfied or violated. In 
the Preference Semantics System preferences are evaluated by the template xpansion algorithm 
(process ~1) operating on the hierarchies of substantive, action, and case primitives (representa- 
tion ~1). If those hierarchies are viewed as semantic networks with arcs denoting class inclusion, 
the algorithm checks to see if preferences are satisfied by constructing network paths: satisfied 
preferences are those paths through the semantic networks of primitives that denote instances 
of class inclusion. Correspondingly, violated preferences are network paths that denote class 
exclusion. 
*ANI * INAN 
S IGNTHISFOLKMAN BEAST PART POINT SPREADL INETHING 
Figure 3. A satisfied preference (i.e., a semantic network path denoting inclusion). 
To illustrate this, consider the preceding analysis of (3) and the satisfied preference found 
between the agent preference of 'drink' and the human sense of 'crook.' The agent preference 
for [drink] is for *ANI, the class of animate things, and the head primitive of the thief sense of 
'crook' is MAN.  These two primitives, *ANI and MAN,  are shown in Figure 3, which is part of 
the semantic network of substantive primitives shown in Figure 1. The network path between 
*ANI and MAN is highlighted in bold. The path denotes inclusion, i.e., men are animate things, 
hence the preference *ANI is satisfied. 
A third meaning of "preference" is selecting the representation with the greatest semantic den- 
sity, which in PS is the representation with the greatest sum of satisfied preferences. The process 
of preference (process #2) embodies this notion of preference, which is the one meant by the term 
"Preference Semantics" and the one mentioned as principle (d) underlying PS in Section 2.1. 
A fourth meaning of "preference" is selecting the most specific representation: alternatives 
are ranked from specific to general, and each one is tried in turn until a match is found. In PS, 
paraplates (representation #5) are ordered and tried in this way by the TIE routines (process #3). 
To quote Wilks [39, p. 165], "paraplates, for a given preposition, are ordered and 'more preferred 
template' simply means 'the paraplate applied earlier'." 
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3. EXTENSIONS OF PREFERENCE SEMANTICS 
Students of Wilks and other researchers have developed the theory in a number of directions. 
Boguraev's work [40] and his analyzer has had a strong influence on the research of Alshawi [41], 
Carter [42,43], Cater [44--46], Fass [27], Huang [47,48] and Tait [49-51] though, by adding an 
explicit syntactic analysis component and depth-first syntax-driven semantic interpretation, all 
of this work departs from Wilks' views on semantic parsing. Slator's [52,53] PREMO analysis 
system, which was less influenced by Boguraev, is most in the spirit of the original PS program. 
Grishman and Sterling's [8] implementation f PS is also described. 
Boguraev [40] focussed on paraphrase, lexical case, and structural ambiguity [54]. He simplified 
some of the representations and processes: introduced obligatory cases into semantic formulas, 
removed bare templates, and simplified paraplates into preplates. Moreover, he put in a depth- 
first syntax-driven (ATN) semantic analyzer in which PS was used to check the internal semantic 
consistency within syntactic onstituents. 
Boguraev's emantic analyzer was integrated into a natural language interface to a data- 
base [55-59]. The same analyzer was also the basis of a series of parsers that used modified 
versions of PS (Alshawi, Carter, Cater, Fass, Huang, Tait) and that addressed a subset of the 
semantic problems tackled by PS. All of these parsers followed Boguraev's lead in being syntax- 
driven. Alshawi used Boguraev's parser and focussed on lexical ambiguity resolution and infer- 
ence. Carter's contributions were in the areas of improved anaphor esolution and more systematic 
semantic formulas, including a better form of self-reference than Wilks' use of the primitive SELF. 
Cater developed an ATN-based semantic analyzer that used a CD-style of semantic representation 
together with semantic interpretation based on the use of preferences. Huang developed XTRA, 
a large English-to-Chinese machine translation system. Semantic interpretation i XTRA was 
based on simple type checking. Metaphor handling was done using relaxation techniques. Special 
attention was paid to the resolution of structural ambiguity [60] and language generation [61]. 
Huang and Guthrie [62] explored implementing a parallel processing version of XTRA. 
Fass's Collative Semantics (hereafter CS) is modeled on PS and aims to provide a deeper 
semantic analysis of metaphor, metonymy, and other related semantic problems. The focus of 
the theory is on lexical ambiguity and seven kinds of semantic relations: literal, metonymic, 
metaphorical, anomalous, redundant, inconsistent, and novel relations. 
"The kettle is boiling" (= the liquid in the kettle) 
"Denise drank the bottle" (= the liquid in the bottle). 
(8) 
(9) 
In a metonymy, the name of one thing is substituted for that of another elated to it. Sen- 
tences (8) and (9) contain examples of metonymy in which the name of a container (kettle, bottle) 
is substituted for its contents. Both of these are CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS metonymies. 
These examples can be contrasted with (1) which contains a metaphor. The difference between 
metaphor and metonymy, according to CS, is that the core of a metaphor is a relevant anal- 
ogy whereas the core of a metonymy is a chain of one or more "metonymic oncepts" [63], like 
CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS or PART FOR WHOLE. For more on this, see [64,65]. 
CS has four components, consisting of two representations, sense-frames and semantic vectors, 
and two processes, collation and screening. Sense-frames are the knowledge representation scheme 
and represent individual word senses. Collation matches the sense-frames of two word senses and 
discriminates the semantic relations between the word senses, as a complex system of mappings 
between their sense-frames. Semantic vectors represent the systems of mappings produced by 
collation and hence, the semantic relations encoded in those mappings (except for metonymic 
relations). Screening chooses between two semantic vectors by applying rank orderings among 
semantic relations and a measure of conceptual similarity, thereby resolving lexical ambiguity. 
CS has been implemented in a computer program called meta5, which analyzes entences, 
discriminates the seven kinds of semantic relation between pairs of word senses in those sentences, 
and resolves any lexical ambiguity. The meta5 program consists of a lexicon containing the 
sense-frames of about 500 word senses, a small grammar, and semantic routines that contain the 
collation and screening processes. 
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Sense-frames are an extension of Wilks' "mixed-type," "re-entrant" semantic formulas but, 
instead of containing a mixture of primitives and words, sense-frames are composed of word 
senses which perform the function of the semantic primitives in PS. These word senses are "re- 
entrant" because they have their own sense-flames, much like Quillian's [66] planes, and much 
like the circular organization of a real dictionary. 
Sense-frames contain preferences and assertions, which distinguish two uses of semantic in- 
formation. A preference contains emantic information expressing a restriction on the local 
context [9,37]; an assertion contains emantic information to be imposed onto the local context. 
For example, the adjective 'female' has a preference for an animate thing (e.g., an animal or 
plant), but its assertion is that the same animate thing is female, hence a 'Temale person" is a 
person (an animate thing) that is female. 
Slator's [52,53] PREMO, short for PREference Machine Organization, is a robust knowledge- 
based parser for natural anguage. Parsing is robust in that some structure is returned for 
every input, no matter how ill-formed or "garden-pathological" it is. PREMO contains a phrase 
grammar and a machine-readable l xicon derived from the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary 
English [67], hereafter LDOCE. The derivation of the lexicon is described elsewhere [11,53,68-72]. 
PREMO uses not only the dictionary entries from LDOCE, but also the grammatical predictions 
that are supplied, the type hierarchy (as given), and the pragmatic hierarchy (somewhat restruc- 
tured). This contrasts with the original PS system which used a hand-coded lexicon and which 
had very little other knowledge of either grammar or pragmatics. 
PREMO is organized like the stack model of a standard operating system. Partial parses are 
represented in "process control block" structures called language objects. The control structure is
a priority queue of these language objects. The language object at the front of the queue has the 
highest score, as computed by a preference metric that weighs grammatical predictions, emantic 
type matching and pragmatic oherence. Each parse is a process operating on a private copy of 
the current sentence. The first process to emerge from the queue with its sentence buffer empty 
is declared the winner and is saved. 
Every language object receives a preliminary preference score when first created. The ini- 
tial score depends on the word's sense number (the lower the word sense number, the higher 
the score, thereby giving an advantage to the lower numbered and more commonly used word 
senses). Immediately thereafter, various attributes of the language object are evaluated and the 
initial score is adjusted. Adjustments to scores are either "minor" (2%), "standard" (10~), or 
"major" (50%), and can be in either direction. Attributes that cause preliminary scores to be 
decreased include an LDOCE time-and-frequency code of "archaic" or "rare." Preliminary scores 
are slightly increased if, for example, the language object is for a phrasal definition (such as "al- 
ternating current"), or if it makes a grammatical prediction, or if it is a word with only a single 
sense definition. Finally, scores are strongly influenced, in either direction, by the position of the 
word with respect o a restructured pragmatic hierarchy computed for the text. For example, if
the text has a scientific orientation, then the scientific senses of words are given increased scores 
(such as the scientific senses of "measure"), and the scores of other senses of those words are 
decreased (such as the political and musical senses, of "measure"). 
The input to PREMO is an unconstrained text and a collection of lexical semantic objects, one 
for every sense of every word in the text [71]. Each lexical semantic object contains grammati- 
cal and sub-categorization nformation, often with general (and sometimes specific) grammatical 
predictions; content word objects also have semantic selection codes; many have contextual (prag- 
matic) knowledge with a score for comparing word senses for their contextual coherence, and the 
text of selected ictionary definitions. 
PREMO employs a uniform representation at the word, phrase, and sentence l vels. Further, 
at every step in the process there is a dominating language object visible; that is, there is always 
a "well-formed partial parse" extant. This gives an appealing processing model (of a language 
understander that stands ready to accept he next word, whatever it may be), and a real-time 
flavor, where the next word is understood in the context of existing structure. One of the PREMO 
design principles is "always return something" and that policy is guaranteed by keeping every 
possibility open, if unexplored (this is the PREMO approximation to back-tracking). 
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By exploiting the operating system metaphor for control, PREMO inherits ome very attractive 
features. First, PREMO avoids combinatorial explosion by ordering the potential parse paths and 
only pursuing the one that seems the best. This is antithetical to the operating system principle 
of "fairness," a point where the metaphor is intentionally abandoned in favor of a scheme that 
has some faint traces of psychological p ausibility. Second, the operating system metaphor is an 
extendible one; that is, it is possible to conceive of PREMO actually being implemented on a 
dedicated machine. Further, since the multiplication factor at each cycle through the algorithm 
is small (in the 40-60 range for the near-worst case of 10-12 word senses, times 4-5 applicable 
grammar ules), and since each of these pairings is independent, it is easy to imagine PREMO 
implemented on a shared memory parallel processor (like a Sequent). Each of the pairs would be 
dispatched to a different processing element. 
"Fred licked his rifle all over and found that the stock tasted good." (10) 
One can view Slator's work as dealing with a criticism of PS, best put by Phil Hayes [73] who 
argued that in (10) the local preferences of PS would always resolve "stock" to "soup" rather than 
the (correct) "gun part." Slator's PREMO has shown how to mold local and global preferences 
so as to tackle precisely such examples. 
Grishman and Sterling [8] have recently implemented a version of PS as part of the PROTEUS 
message understanding system, which processes US Navy OPREP (OPeration REPort) messages 
concerning sightings and engagements at sea. Using PS, PROTEUS correctly analyzed 74% of a 
corpus of 105 messages; without PS, only 54% were correctly analyzed. 
4. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER WORK 
This section relates PS family work against related work, using some of the principles described 
in Section 2.1. 
(a) Computational Semantics 
Among the approaches to computational semantics, PS has been most closely associated, and 
confused, with Conceptual Dependency theory or CD (see [18]). There has certainly been cross 
influence with CD work. Lehnert [74] added noun representations to CD which had until then 
been wholly verb-based. The PHKAN parser [75] explicitly added template-like triples of atoms 
to its parsing recognition system. Carbonell's work on anaphora resolution [76] and robust 
parsing [77] uses an explicit preference measuring algorithm. In the other direction, the addition 
of the common-sense inference rules to PS in 1974 was almost certainly under the influence of 
inference rules in Rieger's [78] work. 
Schank and his associates always took a much less relativistic view of primitives, believing that 
there really was a correct set and that this had a hardware implementation i  human brains. On 
that view, the primitives were not special words at all, as on the PS view they plainly were. This 
was an attempt within CD to achieve successful extra-linguistic reference (even if only to bits of 
the brain), an idea that makes little sense within PS. 
A remaining difference has been the importance of psychological c aims in the CD school and 
their absence in PS, as witness, the two-pass attachment algorithm of [36] which could hardly be 
psychologically valid, but which is effective, and the claimed symmetry of analysis and generation 
in PS [79] whereas CD researchers have always trongly emphasized any connection between their 
representations and psycholinguistic evidence. 
The emphasis in the CD group shifted in the 1980s, from describing their work as natural 
language processing, to describing it as human memory research, but the change was largely 
cosmetic, since at Yale the approach was still applied to machine translation and data-base front- 
ends. Lehnert's [80] recent work, although its title suggests a continuing concern with memory, 
is very much a return to early CD concerns and is certainly computational semantics: in fact, a 
fusion of PS and CD approaches. 
It is also conneetionist as well, by which one means the current cluster of artificial intelligence 
theories around the notion of small computing units, connected in very large numbers, "learning 
from experience" by means of shifting aggregated weights in a network (see [81,82]). This de- 
velopment shares many of the views of PS: an emphasis on non-syntactic methods, a continuity 
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with other forms of world knowledge, and some difficulty in reconciling its claims with those of 
logic-based approaches. 
(d) Preference 
Preference-like notions have been stressed in connectionism, such as competition between rep- 
resentational structures, where the stronger, more connected, ones "win out." Conneetionism, 
however, seeks a more general algorithm than the simple counting relativity by which PS es- 
tablishes the densest network. Sparck Jones (personal communication) has made the point that 
preference counting was less plausible if it were 7 over 6 (as opposed to 10 over 1). This ties 
directly to the concerns of connectionists, who are much concerned with generating "a big enough 
gap" over their representations. 
Preference notions can also be seen in the general idea of optimizing numerical values for lexical 
ambiguity resolution, in the marker passing approaches of Charniak [83] and Hirst [84], as well 
as connectionist approaches to lexical ambiguity resolution, such as Waltz and Pollack's [82]. 
Grishman and Sterling's [8] version of PS included a "longest parse" mechanism which was 
built into their original scoring scheme. Their notion of partial model is a key one here: n formal 
technique that leads to algorithms of exactly this type (selecting the largest partial model). In 
the belief area, this is not so far from Gaspar's [85] notion of preferred model of belief (which 
tends to be the largest set though her method of choosing it is unclear). 
Other related notions of preference have appeared over the years in natural anguage processing, 
often used for ambiguity resolution, including [86-91]. Preference-like notions also appear in 
robust parsing techniques, for example, "least-deviant first parsing" [77] resembles the most- 
preferred first parsing used in PS. 
A notion of "syntactic preference" has been used by Pereira [92], Hobbs and Bear [93] and 
others, from the Frazier and Fodor [94] tradition of Minimal Attachment and Kimball's [95] ideas 
on Right Association, and this tradition has now adopted the notion of "lexical preference," 
possibly stemming from PS (see also Schubert's work [96,97]). 
Pereira [92] proposes what he claims is a simple, precise, falsifiable, general framework "in which 
improved versions of Right Association and Minimal Attachment can be formulated." Within 
the framework, the two principles RA and MA "correspond to two precise rules on how to choose 
between alternative parsing actions." It is also claimed that principles like RA and MA can be 
described "starting from very few assumptions about grammar and parsing mechanisms." The 
parsing mechanism proposed is bottom-up using the shift-reduce method. Hobbs and Bear's [93] 
approach within their Dialogic system is generalized to "pick the reading with the most restrictive 
context." 
(e) Semantic Parsing 
There has always been confusion about what was semantic parsing as part of PS. It was 
certainly never claimed that syntactic information was not used in parsing: it is only necessary 
to note that a parser of English needs to know that adjectives normally follow determiners, to 
show that semantic parsing proponents could hardly have denied that. What semantic parsing 
argued was that all such information could be expressed in semantic terms, whether or not it was 
more efficient o do so, and so no separate syntactic analysis module was required. 
What semantic parsing is certainly inconsistent with is any syntactic parsing theory that claims 
(e.g., [98]) that the constraints of Chomsky's Universal Grammar can be given procedural form, 
and that there are important generalizations, having nothing whatever to do with meaning, that 
any parsing system must take account of, and which cannot be expressed at all in an semantic 
parsing approach. 
"the lecture was believed to have been given yesterday." (11) 
The work of Marcus and others has marvellously sharpened what it is semantic parsing has to 
show to stay in business. Consider the Marcus/trace account of a sentence like (11). Any semantic 
parsing account can deal with this, given plausible assumptions about the semantic preferences 
for filling the slots involved, e.g., that "believe" prefers a clause to an entity as object, if it can 
get one, etc., taken together with general heuristics about what kinds of slot (e.g., subjects) hold 
or cede their contents during any reorganization of the structure of the sentence. 
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(h) Semantic Primitives 
There has been much misunderstanding of the claims about primitives in PS and their relativis- 
tic nature (as opposed to the CD claims). Criticisms of the notion of primitives from Hayes [99] 
and Winograd [100] have missed this point, as did the architects of KRL [101] when attacking 
PS, an issue that was clarified in [102]. 
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